Before Jones, Smith, and Ho, Circuit Judges. Jerry E. Smith, Circuit Judge: Sha Kendrick Smith was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) of enticing a minor to engage in prostitution. Smith’s minor victim (“MV”) was a thirteen-year-old runaway girl who was a ward of the state. The district court imposed sentencing enhancements; Smith appeals two of them. First, he appeals the enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B) because of his undue influence over MV. Second, he ques- tions the enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1) because of MV’s status as a vulnerable victim. We reject Smith’s challenges and affirm his sentence. I. MV ran away from her middle school. She was suspected to be with Smithwhom she referred to as “Kendrick,” a pimp who was believed to be causing MV to engage in commercial sex. While she was a runaway, MV used a cell phone that Kendrick provided to communicate with a Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”). MV told the CASA that Kendrick, who always carries a gun, took her to a trailer park and caused her to engage in commercial sex. She stated that Kendrick also had sex with her. She texted photos to the CASA. MV told the CASA that she was staying in a dwelling with Kendrick and his mother. She was allowed to be inside during the day but could not be in the residence at night and had to sleep in a car in the driveway. According to MV, Smith took her to multiple locations over twelve days; MV engaged in commercial sex with at least eight men. Smith re- portedly charged the men between $70 and $100 to have sex with MV. MV initially told Smith that she was eighteen years old, but he “learned [that] she was under the age of 18 while she was engaged in prostitution.” A few weeks after MV ran away, a police officer responded to a call regarding a sexual assault. The officer talked to the complainant, who was identified as MV. MV informed the officer that she left her middle school a few weeks earlier and met a person who offered to give her a ride. MV went with the person to his house for three days but did not have sex with him. After she left the person’s home, she met a forty-year-old man who offered to pay her $20 to watch her take a shower. She revealed that she later met a man, identified as Smith, at a gas station near her middle school; she carried a clear backpack containing pencils and papers as a student would. Smith, who was twenty-one, offered to help MV make money by participating in commercial sex; MV agreed to engage in prostitution. After her interview with the officer, MV ran away again within two days. Nearly two weeks later, she walked into a police station. Before she was questioned by officers, MV was taken to a hospital to be medically cleared because she had consumed drugs. MV informed officers that she had returned to prostitution. She main- tained that she had willingly engaged in prostitution because she needed money. She stated that she met her “pimp” at a gas station near her middle school but declined to give further details. She insisted that her “pimp,” who also tried to earn money by selling marihuana, was a “good guy” who did not hit her. MV asserted that her “pimp” saw the Amber Alert that was issued for her and told her to turn herself into CPS. A stranger brought her to the police station. During a subsequent interview with officers, MV stated that her “pimp,” identified as Smith, met her on the streets and took her to his mother’s trailer. MV stayed there with Smith, who had sex with her and caused her to engage in commercial sex with other men. The men paid Smith for sex with her; Smith kept all the money. Officers learned that people who knew Smith, a suspected gang member, feared him and thought he was dangerous. Officers discovered that Smith’s mother owned the phone number for the cell phone that Smith provided to MV. Officers recovered information from a Snapchat account that they traced to Smith. A picture from the account set forth the prices for sexual encounters. Other pictures showed MV in a sports bra with her pants pulled down to reveal her buttocks and with her breasts exposed. The photographs were sent to other Snapchat users. The account also included photographs of drugs, pictures of Smith holding a pistol, and discussions about the sale of drugs. Officers talked to Smith’s mother as part of their investigation. Smith’s mother indicated that her fiancé had driven MV to Houston and that MV looked to be about fifteen. Additionally, officers talked to Smith’s sister, who suspected that MV was under the age of eighteen and was engaging in commercial sex. Smith subsequently pleaded guilty to coercion and enticement of a minor. See 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). The presentence investigation report (“PSR”) assessed a total offense level of 38. Smith received, inter alia, (1) a two-level adjustment per U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B) on the ground that he unduly influenced a minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct and (2) a two-level adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1) on the basis that he knew or should have known that MV was a vulnerable victim. He was placed in criminal history category I. His guidelines range was 235 to 293 months. Smith objected to the PSR. The government filed a response. The probation officer submitted two addenda to the PSR. At the sentencing hearing, the district court overruled Smith’s objec- tion to the undue-influence enhancement “for the reasons stated in the gov- ernment’s response and the addendum.” It overruled Smith’s objection to the vulnerable-victim enhancement “because the Court concludes that the credible evidence established for the reasons stated in the addendum, the [PSR], and the government’s opposition that you either knew or should have known that the girl in question was a vulnerable victim.” The court adopted the PSR and sentenced Smith to 235 months of imprisonment and ten years of supervised release. II. The district court evaluates whether the adjustment should be applied under the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. See United States v. Herrera-Solorzano, 114 F.3d 48, 50 (5th Cir. 1997). This Court reviews the district court’s interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. Factual findings underlying the district court’s application of the Guidelines are reviewed for clear error. There is no clear error if the district court’s finding is plausible in light of the record as a whole. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous only if, after reviewing all the evidence, the Court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. United States v. Pringler, 765 F.3d 445, 451 (5th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). Whether somebody exercised undue influence over a minor is a fac- tual finding subject to clear-error review. See id. at 456.[1] Likewise “a district court’s application of ‘unusual vulnerability’ in the arena of sentencing is for clear error.” United States v. Swenson, 25 F.4th 309, 321 (5th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). The district court may rely on facts in the PSR so long as they are supported by sufficient indicia of reliability and not rebutted by the defen- dant. See United States v. Harris, 702 F.3d 226, 230–31 (5th Cir. 2012). “There is no clear error if the district court’s finding is plausible in light of the record as a whole.” Pringler, 765 F.3d at 451 (citation omitted). There is some dispute about whether Smith properly preserved his argument that we cannot consider MV’s age at all. We pretermit that as not being outcome-determinative. III. Section 2G1.3(b)(2)(B) states, If . . . a participant . . . unduly influenced a minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct, increase by 2 levels. . . . In determining whether subsection (b)(2)(B) applies, the court should closely consider the facts of the case to determine whether a participant’s influence over the minor compromised the voluntariness of the minor’s behavior. The voluntariness of the minor’s behavior may be compromised without prohibited sexual conduct occurring. Id. & cmt. n. 3.[2] There is no dispute that MV engaged in prohibited sexual conduct. The central question, then, is whether it is plausible in light of the record as a whole that the voluntariness of MV’s behavior was compromised. The answer to that question is easily yes. All one needs to do is compare side-by-side the facts that plausibly support each side of the analysis. In support of voluntariness (or at least miti- gating factors that support the opposite finding): MV voluntarily absconded from her middle school. MV had gone and stayed at another man’s house for a few days before encountering Smith. MV had been offered to shower in front of another man for $20 before meeting Smith. MV characterized her prostitution as willing.[3] MV’s statement that Smith was a “good guy” who never hit her. MV’s apparently free ability to use a phone given to her by Smith. Smith does not seem to have prevented her from leaving. And undermining voluntariness: MV was 13. Smith was 8 years her senior. Smith and MV had sex.[4] Smith was 6’2″, 300 lbs. MV noticed that Smith always carried a gun, and he posted pic- tures of himself online holding a pistol. People in Smith’s area were afraid of him because they knew he was dangerous. MV was a ward of the state in need of money. Smith coordinated MV’s transportation to and from other men. Smith kept all the money generated. Smith took MV to his mother’s home and she was made to sleep outside in the car. There is reason to believe that MV used drugs during her time with Smith. Smith only ended her prostitution after an Amber Alert was is- sued. Smith gave her a cell phone.[5] Recall the standard of review. Considering these facts as a whole, could one plausibly find that the voluntariness of MV’s conduct was compromised? Easily. The defense’s remaining arguments are meritless. The defense points out that while Smith and MV had sex at least once, there is no evidence it was not consensual or that he knew she was a minor at the time. Indeed, says the defense, there is no evidence Smith ever learned she was thirteen, but only that she was a minor.[6] This is meritless. Yes, obviously non-consensual sex with a minor Smith knew was thirteen would be worse. But that does not mean that the fact that he had sex with MV is not a strong data point in the case for compromised voluntariness. Indeed, we have affirmed this enhancement in part based on evidence that “sexual relations between a pimp and his prostitute is [a] control mechanism.” Pringler, 765 F.3d at 456. Citing the Sixth Circuit,[7] the defense also avers that there must be some set of cases of child prostitution to which this enhancement does not apply. Whether or not that is true, there is plenty of room between applying the enhancement to this case and always applying the enhancement to this sort of offense. Smith also compares this case to United States v. Myers, 481 F.3d 1107 (8th Cir. 2007). But that case is distinct in many respects. First, that court affirmed a district court’s finding that the enhancement did not apply. Id. at 1108. Here, defense asks us to find clear error and reverse. Second, this case involves, inter alia, a younger victim, the presence of a firearm, and the victim’s desperation as emphasized by her willingness to sleep in a car outside. Finally, Smith insists on evidence that explicitly connects the factors above to the involuntariness of MV’s conduct. That asks too much. Smith points to no caselaw that would impose such a requirement.[8] And in this posture, we need only review the record as a whole to determine whether the finding that her voluntariness was compromised was plausible. Smith’s case rests on the following presumption: When a thirteen- year-old girl says she voluntarily worked for her “pimp” who was a “good guy,” you’d better believe her.[9] That’s preposterous. There is ample data here to support a plausible finding that MV’s voluntariness was undermined. IV. Section 3A1.1(b)(1) provides, “If the defendant knew or should have known that a victim of the offense was a vulnerable victim, increase by 2 levels.” The commentary continues: For purposes of subsection (b), “vulnerable victim” means a person (A) who is a victim of the offense of conviction and any conduct for which the defendant is accountable under
