Before Justices Pedersen, III, Smith, and Garcia Opinion by Justice Smith Appellants Baylor Scott & White Health and Scott & White Healthcare (collectively, BSW) appeal the trial court’s judgment in favor of appellee Jerry Bostick. In four issues, BSW asserts that errors in the jury charge resulted in an improper judgment and the trial court erred in denying its motion to transfer venue. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for a new trial on Bostick’s premises liability claim against BSW. Background Bostick brought this suit to recover for injuries he sustained from a fall at a BSW hospital in Marble Falls, Texas. He filed a petition in Travis County, asserting claims against Baylor Scott & White Health and several other defendants.[1] Bostick alleged that venue was proper in Travis County because at least one defendant had a principal office in the county. Baylor Scott & White Health filed a motion to transfer venue and answer to the petition. It asserted that Bostick had alleged no facts to show the events or omissions giving rise to any claim occurred in Travis County and that none of the defendants resided, or had their principal offices, in Travis County.[2] Because Travis County was not a proper venue for the suit, Baylor Scott & White Health requested that the trial court transfer the suit to Burnet County, where all of the events or omissions allegedly occurred and Bostick resided. Bostick did not respond. Instead, he nonsuited and refiled his suit in Dallas County. Bostick’s new petition added Scott & White Healthcare as a defendant, omitted one of the other defendants, and alleged that at least one defendant had a principal office in Dallas County. BSW moved to transfer venue to Burnet County, and the trial court denied the motion. The case was tried to a jury. A number of witnesses testified. During Bostick’s testimony, he explained that, on November 10, 2017, he noticed an ambulance at his neighbor Charley Selman’s house. Selman had fallen and was being transported to the hospital. Bostick, following the ambulance, drove Selman’s wife to the hospital. They checked in at a reception booth, and a nurse led then to Selman in the treatment area through two sets of automatic doors. Because the hospital allowed only two visitors at a time in its treatment area, Bostick headed back to the reception area so Selman’s pastor could be with Selman. Bostick told the hospital employee in the reception booth that he needed to return to the lobby, and she opened a set of doors for him. He assumed that she pushed a button to activate the doors. Bostick raised his hand to get the pastor’s attention, and one door started to close against him. He pulled the door “back a little tug,” but it continued to move toward him, hit him on his left side, and knocked him to the floor. Bostick suffered a broken hip. BSW moved for a directed verdict, challenging, among other things, the sufficiency of the evidence that Bostick was an invitee of the hospital at the time of the incident. The trial court denied BSW’s motion. During the charge conference, Bostick requested that the trial court submit the Texas Pattern Jury Charge’s disjunctive jury question on whether he was an invitee or a licensee on BSW’s premises when he became injured.[3] BSW objected to the proposed question, asserting that Bostick had not pleaded he was a licensee, there was no evidence that would allow for the submission of Bostick’s status as an invitee, and the definition of invitee misstated the law. The trial court overruled BSW’s objections, rejected its alternative definition of invitee, and submitted Bostick’s requested question to the jury. Finding that Bostick was an invitee and BSW was ninety-four percent responsible for causing or contributing to his injuries, the jury returned a verdict in Bostick’s favor for $2,470,000. The trial court signed a final judgment consistent with the verdict. BSW filed a motion to disregard the jury findings and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, alternatively, motion for new trial. The motion was overruled by operation of law, and this appeal followed. Invitee Status In its first three issues, BSW contends that the trial court erred in overruling its objections to the jury charge’s disjunctive liability question, including the definition of an invitee, and the erroneous charge cause the rendition of an improper judgment. Standard of Review A trial court “shall submit the questions, instructions, and definitions . . . which are raised by the written pleadings and the evidence.” See TEX. R. CIV. P. 278; Columbia Rio Grande Healthcare, L.P. v. Hawley, 284 S.W.3d 851, 855–56 (Tex. 2009). A question or instruction cannot be submitted to the jury unless it has been properly raised by the pleadings and the evidence. In re Est. of Poe, 648 S.W.3d 277, 285 (Tex. 2022) (citing Hawley, 284 S.W.3d at 855). “A trial court has broad discretion in constructing the charge, so long as it is legally correct.” Emerson Elec. Co. v. Johnson, 627 S.W.3d 197, 208 (Tex. 2021). We review a trial court’s jury charge rulings for an abuse of discretion, Sw. Energy Prod. Co. v. Berry–Helfand, 491 S.W.3d 699, 727–28 (Tex. 2016), but whether a definition in the charge misstates the law is a legal question that we review de novo. Seger v. Yorkshire Ins. Co., Ltd., 503 S.W.3d 388, 408 (Tex. 2016). We will not reverse a judgment for charge error unless the error probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment or probably prevented the appellant from properly presenting the case on appeal. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a)(1). “Charge error is generally considered harmful if it relates to a contested, critical issue.” See Hawley, 284 S.W.3d at 856. Applicable Law A person injured on another’s property may sue a property owner under a premises-liability theory for injuries sustained as the result of an unreasonably dangerous condition on the owner’s premises.[4] See Keetch v. Kroger Co., 845 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex. 1992). Premises liability is a special form of negligence in which the duty owed to the plaintiff depends on the plaintiff’s status on the premises at the time of the injury-causing event. See Scott & White Mem’l Hosp. v. Fair, 310 S.W.3d 411, 412 (Tex. 2010). A premises-liability plaintiff usually is classified as either a trespasser, licensee, or invitee.[5] Mellon Mortg. Co. v. Holder, 5 S.W.3d 654, 655 (Tex. 1999). “Generally, a premises-liability plaintiff’s status is a question of law, though it can be a question for the jury when facts relevant to the legal standard are in dispute.” Cath. Diocese of El Paso v. Porter, 622 S.W.3d 824, 829 (Tex. 2021). An invitee is one who enters an owner’s property “with the owner’s knowledge and for the mutual benefit of both.” Id. An owner owes an invitee the duty “to exercise reasonable care to protect against danger from a condition on the land that creates an unreasonable risk of harm of which the owner . . . knew or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover.” Id. (quoting Fair, 310 S.W.3d at 412). A licensee is one who enters on another’s premises “merely by permission, express or implied, and not by any express or implied invitation.” Id. The duty owed a licensee is the lesser duty to “use ordinary care either to warn a licensee of, or to make reasonably safe, a dangerous condition of which the owner is aware and the licensee is not.” Id. Analysis Definition of Invitee In its second issue, BSW contends that the trial court erred in overruling its objection to the definition of invitee proposed by Bostick and refusing to submit the definition it proposed. Based on this Court’s precedent, we agree. Following the Texas Pattern Jury Charge, the trial court charged the jury: An invitee is a person who is on the premises at the express or implied invitation of the possessor of the premises and who has entered thereon either as a member of the public for a purpose for which the premises are held open to the public or for a purpose connected with the business of the possessor that does or may result in their mutual economic benefit. See Comm. on Pattern Jury Charges, State Bar of Tex., Texas Pattern Jury Charges: Malpractice, Premises & Products, PJC 66.7 (2018). The definition is aligned with the Restatement (Second) of Torts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 (1965). Under the Restatement, a visitor is an invitee if he is either a public invitee, defined as “a person who is invited to enter or remain on land as a member of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open to the public”, or a business visitor, defined as “a person who is invited to enter or remain on land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor of the land.” Porter, 622 S.W.3d at 830 n.31 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332). The Texas Supreme Court, however, more narrowly defines an invitee as “one who enters the property of another with the owner’s knowledge and for the mutual benefit of both.” Id. at 829–30. Further, “the requisite ‘mutual benefit’ to an invitee and an owner or occupier of property is a shared business or economic interest.” Id. (“the business on which the visitor comes must be one of at least potential pecuniary profit to the owner or occupier”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The supreme court has yet to decide whether “invitee status always requires that the business benefit shared by the property visitor and the owner/occupier be economic in nature.” Id. at 830. The supreme court has acknowledged that business visitors, as defined in the Restatement, would likely qualify as invitees under its “potential-economic-benefit test.” Id. at 830 n.31. However, it has not adopted the Restatement’s public invitee doctrine.[6] Id. This Court also has not adopted the public invitee doctrine; in fact, we have specifically declined to adopt it. Osadchy v. S. Methodist Univ., 232 S.W.3d 844, 849 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied). Being bound by our own precedent, see OAIC Com. Assets, L.L.C. v. White, 293 S.W.3d 883, 885 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied) (citing Weiner v. Wasson, 900 S.W.2d 316, 320 (Tex. 1995)), we conclude the trial court erred in including the public invitee component in the invitee definition submitted to the jury. We further conclude, having reviewed the entire record, that the error was harmful. The inclusion of an improper definition is “especially likely to cause an unfair trial when the trial is contested and the evidence sharply conflicting.” Quantum Chem. Corp. v. Toennies, 47 S.W.3d 473, 480 (Tex. 2001); Hawley, 284 S.W.3d at 856. Whether Bostick was a BSW invitee when he was injured at the hospital was contested at trial. His counsel elicited testimony that the hospital’s emergency department waiting area was open to the general public, and in closing argument, encouraged the jury to find Bostick an invitee based on the fact that he entered the hospital as a member of the public and for a purpose for which the premises were held open to the public. On this record, we conclude that the charge error, which allowed the jury to use an incorrect legal standard in determining liability, was likely to have resulted in an improper judgment against BSW and, therefore, constituted reversible error. Accordingly, we sustain BSW’s second and third issues. In doing so, we recognize that Texas “courts routinely rely on the Pattern Jury Charges in submitting cases to juries, and [the supreme court] rarely disapprove[s] of” them. Ford Motor Co. v. Ledesma, 242 S.W.3d 32, 45 (Tex. 2007). However, they are not law, and courts must depart from them “when necessary to accurately state the law or submit a question to the jury.” JNM Express, LLC v. Lozano, 688 S.W.3d 327, 332 n.14 (Tex. 2024); Hollingsworth v. Parklane Corp., No. 05-19- 01576-CV, 2021 WL 1290735, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 7, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). Disjunctive Liability Question In its first issue, BSW contends the trial court erred in overruling its objection to and submitting a disjunctive liability question where: (1) Bostick pleaded his premises claim only as an invitee; (2) there is no evidence Bostick was an invitee; and (3) under Texas law, a hospital visitor is a licensee as a matter of law. Asserting that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, BSW requests that we reverse and either render judgment on Bostick’s pleaded invitee theory or remand for a new trial utilizing the licensee liability standard. Sufficiency of Bostick’s Pleading Bostick’s live petition at the time of trial alleged that he “was an invitee at the time of his injury as he was a guest of Defendant BSW and/or Scott & White Healthcare.” The petition also recited the liability standard applicable to an invitee: that BSW “knew or should have known that the door system was unsafe for guests.” The jury charge, however, provided definitions of both invitee and licensee and asked the jury to determine whether Bostick was an invitee or a licensee on BSW’s premises on the occasion in question. “Texas follows a ‘fair notice’ standard for pleading, which requires that “[a]n original pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contain . . . a short statement of the cause of action sufficient to give fair notice of the claim involved . . . .” DeRoeck v. DHM Ventures, LLC, 556 S.W.3d 831, 835 (Tex. 2018) (per curiam) (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 47). A petition must include “fair and adequate notice” of the factual allegations that support the claims for relief. Id. It is sufficient if the opposing party “can ascertain from the pleading the nature and basic issues of the controversy and what testimony will be relevant.” Id. (quoting Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887, 896 (Tex. 2000)). “Even the omission of an element is not fatal if the cause of action ‘may be reasonably inferred from what is specifically stated.’” In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 590 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 601 (Tex. 1993)). Here, the nature and basic issues of the controversy—that Bostick fell at a BSW hospital and asserted a cause of action for premises liability against BSW— were ascertainable from his petition. It is true that he specifically pleaded invitee status. However, the petition also alleged facts to support his status as both an invitee and licensee, including that BSW “knew or should have known that the door system was unsafe for guests, patients and others at the facility” and “had actual or constructive notice of the condition of the premises.” Accordingly, we conclude that Bostick’s petition provided fair notice of the nature and basic issues of the controversy and what testimony would be relevant to his premises liability claim and was sufficient to support submission of the disjunctive jury question. Sufficiency of Evidence to Support Submission of Invitee Status BSW next asserts that there is no evidence that Bostick was an invitee to the hospital; instead, he was a licensee as a matter of law. In doing so, BSW relies on cases in which three of our sister courts concluded that hospital visitors were licensees as a matter of law in the absence of summary judgment evidence that their presence was for their and the hospital’s mutual benefit or for the purpose of conducting business with the hospital. See Lujan v. Methodist Hosp., No. 01-20- 00158-CV, 2020 WL 7702185, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 29, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (plaintiff fell at hospital while visiting brother, a surgery patient); Wilson v. Nw. Texas Healthcare Sys., Inc., 576 S.W.3d 844, 850 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2019, no pet.) (plaintiff fell on hospital premises while visiting wife, a patient); Wong v. Tenet Hosps. Ltd., 181 S.W.3d 532, 538 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, no pet.) (plaintiff, at hospital to visit mother, fell while walking through landscaped area between street and sidewalk adjacent to hospital). To the extent that BSW argues generally that hospital visitors injured on hospital premises are licensees as a matter of law, we disagree. The cases cited above indicate that a hospital visitor may be classified as a licensee.[7] However, a premises-liability plaintiff’s status remains a fact-based inquiry. See Bradford v. Texas Health Harris Methodist Hosp., No. 02-20-00357-CV, 2021 WL 1800181, at *4 n.2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 6, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (disagreeing that “Texas law is clear that [hospital visitor] was a licensee at the time of the incident” when she proffered summary judgment evidence arguably raising a fact issue as to her status, including that she was at hospital to help son’s girlfriend during childbirth). Accordingly, we must consider whether there was legally sufficient evidence that Bostick was an invitee at the time of his fall to determine whether the trial court properly submitted the disjunctive jury question. In reviewing whether there is legally sufficient evidence to support submission of a jury question, we examine the record for evidence supporting the question’s submission and ignore all evidence to the contrary. Elbaor v. Smith, 845 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex. 1992). A trial court must “submit a question on a controlling issue if evidence to support the submission amounts to “more than a scintilla.” See
