The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has agreed to hear argument over whether a 30-day time limit to file affidavits applies to divorce cases.

The justices granted allowance of appeal in a case involving a man who died intestate and the parsing of his estate. The justices denied allocatur on every question but one:

“Did the Superior Court decision deviate from well-established principles of statutory construction when the lower court held that the General Assembly intended to incorporate the 30-day procedural requirement of Pa.R.C.P. 1920.42(b), with regard to the filing of affidavits of consent in divorce actions, into 20 Pa.C.S. Section 6111.2, where the language of Section 6111.2 is clear and unambiguous and does not contain such time limitation?”

According to the Superior Court's opinion, decedent Michael Easterday served his second wife Colleen Easterday with divorce papers one year before his death. The couple had executed a prenuptial agreement waiving any rights in and to the pension and retirement plans of the other, including any right the parties may have as a surviving spouse or beneficiary, Judge Anne Lazarus said in the Superior Court's ruling.

At the time of Michael Easterday's death, Colleen Easterday was still named the beneficiary of his insurance and pension benefits. Three days after his death, Colleen Easterday withdrew the divorce proceedings.

Michael Easterday's son and the executor of his estate, Matthew Easterday, filed a motion to compel Colleen Easterday to give back the proceeds she had received from the estate.

A judge ruled the estate was entitled to Michael Easterday's pension benefits pursuant to the PNA, but Colleen Easterday was entitled to the insurance proceeds, which were not addressed in the agreement. The parties both filed appeals.

One argument, for which allocatur was granted, was whether the date of execution of the consent affidavit invalidated the naming of Colleen Easterday as a beneficiary.

Lazarus pointed to Pa.R.C.P. 1920.42(b), which says “affidavits of consent must be filed (1) 90 days or more after filing and service of the complaint and (2) within 30 days of the date the consents are executed.”

The estate argued that the 30-day time limit did not apply to consent affidavits in divorce actions.

But Lazarus, joined by Judges Correale Stevens and Jack Panella, disagreed.

“In light of the various policy considerations favoring the protection of the family unit, the Rules of Civil Procedure preclude the entry of default judgments in the divorce context,” Lazarus said. “In keeping with these policy considerations and the seriousness with which the dissolution of marriage is to be treated, Rule 1920.42(b) requires that the parties' affidavits of consent demonstrate a present intent to finalize a divorce by mandating that they be executed
within 30 days of filing. Under the rule, stale affidavits may not form the basis for the entry of a final decree.”

Noting the “added significance” the establishment of grounds takes on when one party dies during the pendency of divorce action, Lazarus continued, ”It is reasonable to conclude that the legislature intended to require compliance with the same procedural requirements precedent to the entry of a divorce decree. Consequently, we conclude that a 'stale' affidavit of consent is insufficient to establish grounds under Section 3323(g).”

The estate also argued that, even if the 30-day limit applied, requiring strict compliance would elevate form over substance. But Lazarus waved off that argument as well.

“While, under other facts, this argument might be persuasive, under the present circumstances, we find that waiving the requirement would not effectuate justice where the decedent had an
opportunity to rectify the untimely affidavit but, for whatever reason, chose not to do so,” Lazarus said.

The estate is represented by David R. Dautrich and Colleen Easterday is represented by Robert Dougher. Neither returned calls seeking comment