In a case of first impression, the Commonwealth Court ruled that a 10-year employment ban imposed on a school groundskeeper who was fired for not reporting a felony charge against him was an unconstitutional due process violation.

The ruling means the groundskeeper has a second chance in his lawsuit against the school in which he alleges he was improperly terminated.

The Commonwealth Court reversed a Montgomery County judge's grant of summary judgment in favor of the School District of Cheltenham and sent plaintiff Patrick Megraw's case back to the lower court.

The school district fired for Megraw in 2016 for failing to report felony gun charges that earned him a sentence of two to four years' probation. Megraw argued that at the time of his conviction, in 2009, the law did not require him to report the felony. He claimed his due process rights were violated when the school applied a 2011 statute that subjected Megraw to a 10-year ban from working in public schools.

The law at issue is Section 111(f.1)(1) of the Public School Code of 1949 (Code), 24 P.S. Section 1-111(f.1)(1). The section states that anyone convicted of a first-, second-, or third-degree felony is banned from working in a state-run school.

According to Commonwealth Court Judge Ellen Ceisler, who penned the court's opinion, both sides in the case pointed to the Commonwealth Court's 2012 ruling in Johnson v. Allegheny Intermediate Unit. Ceisler, joined by Judge Patricia McCullough and Senior Judge James Gardner Colins, said Johnson ”is part of a larger corpus of case law, dating back to 1973, in which our appellate courts have validated both facial and as-applied substantive due process challenges to statutory employment bans and other similar laws predicated upon prior convictions.”

Ceisler said those cases dealt with lifetime bans, meaning the issue of whether a time-limited ban is similarly unconstitutional is one of first impression.

Still, she rejected the school district's claim that Megraw's case was distinguishable from Johnson.

“The right affected by Section 111(f.1)(1), namely employment in one's desired field, as well as the predication of this statute's employment ban upon previous convictions, are not so distinguishable,” the judge added. “Thus, while the particulars of this matter are unique, these cases still serve to define the contours of our analysis.”

Cheltenham argued that Megraw's failure to report the charges showed dishonesty, and thus, made him untrustworthy. It also asserted the failure to report was part of a larger pattern of bad behavior consisting of habitual lateness and absences as well as poor performance and falling asleep on the job.

But Ceisler said the statute can not be applied in a vacuum.

“While both a statutory employment ban's duration and the length of time between conviction and sanction are important elements of an inquiry into such a ban's constitutionality, the law does not permit these factors to be assessed in a mechanical fashion to determine whether a ban passes muster,” Ceisler said. “Both the 10-year ban, as well as the seven-year, eight-month gap between the activity which gave rise to Mr. Megraw's criminal conviction and his subsequent firing, represent significant lengths of time, which must be treated as such when assessing the ban's as-applied constitutionality.”

Ceisler added, “Here, it would take a significant leap of logic, in support of which the school district offers no evidence, to affirmatively link Mr. Megraw's decision to disavow his guilty plea with his ability to diligently, faithfully, and honestly mow lawns and trim bushes at the school district's behest.”

Michael D. Kristofco of Wisler Pearlstine represents the school district and did not respond to a request for comment. Nor did Megraw's lawyer, Charles L. Herring.