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The Pennsylvania Superior Court has ruled that a judge's decision to reject a negotiated sentence is not in and of itself grounds to seek recusal.

In a published April 8 opinion in Commonwealth v. Blount, a three-judge panel of the Superior Court ruled that Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas Judge Barbara McDermott was not required to recuse from defendant John Blount's case after she rejected a negotiated sentencing offer.

“We hold that merely because the district attorney and defense counsel negotiate a stipulated sentence, the sentencing judge is not bound thereby and has the ultimate independent responsibility to impose a sentence consistent with the Sentencing Code,” Judge Correale Stevens wrote for the panel. “The fact Judge McDermott ultimately rejected the parties' negotiated sentence does not require the conclusion that she was biased, prejudiced, or unfair such that she should have recused herself from this matter.”

Stevens was joined by Judges Judith Ference Olson and Alice Beck Dubow.

Blount had argued that McDermott had stated in other cases that she would recuse herself if she rejected a negotiated sentence but failed to follow her own rule in his case.

The panel, however, found that Blount failed to timely ask for McDermott's recusal when she first indicated that she had no obligation to accept the negotiated sentence.

The panel also agreed with McDermott's position that rejecting a negotiated sentence is distinguishable from rejecting a plea agreement.

McDermott wrote in her opinion that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's 1969 ruling in Commonwealth v. Evans, which Blount relied on in pushing for her recusal, was “irrelevant, as the instant appellant was not negotiating his own guilty plea; he was rightfully convicted of his crimes in 1990.”

Evans had summarized the ABA Minimum Standards for guilty pleas in place at the time, suggesting that a trial judge who rejected a negotiated plea offer should then seek to have the case transferred to another judge.

“At no point during the instant proceedings was [Judge McDermott] required to make a decision that would affect the guilt or innocence of [appellant],” McDermott wrote in her opinion.

McDermott also wrote that Blount “fails to establish that [Judge McDermott] was incapable of honorably, fairly, and competently presiding over the instant matter.”

“He has presented no evidence of bias, prejudice, or unfairness necessary to show that [Judge McDermott's] recusal was warranted,” McDermott wrote. “[Appellant] fails to meet his burden.[Appellant's] position reveals his naked attempt to shop for a favorable judge in this jurisdiction.”

“Applying the appropriate standard, we specifically conclude appellant has not produced any evidence of bias, prejudice, or unfairness that raises a substantial doubt as to Judge McDermott's ability to preside over appellant's sentencing proceedings impartially,” Stevens said. “Moreover, we note it is well-settled that the Sentencing Code places an independent obligation upon a judge to impose a sentence, which the judge finds appropriate upon consideration of the factors set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. Section 9721(b).3.”

Blount was convicted in 1990 of shooting and killing two men when he was 17 years old and was sentenced to two consecutive sentences of death, according to the opinion.

He was resentenced in 2018 in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark rulings in Miller v. Alabama from 2012, which imposed a ban on mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles, and Montgomery v. Louisiana from 2016, which made Miller retroactive.

McDermott imposed a new sentence of 35 years to life imprisonment for each count of first-degree murder, to run concurrently.

In addition to his recusal argument, Blount argued on appeal that McDermott imposed an excessive minimum sentence that failed to consider his “'rehabilitation, growth, and remorse,'” as well as the protection of the public.

But Stevens said McDermott “properly weighed and considered the protection of the public, the gravity of appellant's offense as it relates to the impact on the lives of the victims' families and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of appellant.”

The Superior Court also rejected Blount's argument that a maximum sentence of life is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile offenders and that it afforded him no meaningful opportunity for release.

“Here, the lower court sentenced appellant to an aggregate minimum term of 35 years' imprisonment,” Stevens said. “Appellant has been incarcerated for his crime since the time of his arrest when he was 17 years old. Upon resentencing, the trial court gave appellant credit for all time served from the date of his arrest. Thus, appellant will be eligible for parole when he is 52 years old. Accordingly, appellant's claim that his sentence offers him no meaningful opportunity for parole is without merit.”

Blount's attorney, Bradley Bridge of the Defender Association of Philadelphia, said, “It's troubling that a judge would announce that she would recuse herself if she didn't accept the negotiated sentence and that she didn't apply her own rule to this case. It's more troubling that the Superior Court wasn't troubled by such an inconsistent application of the recusal rule.”

Bridge said he plans to seek state Supreme Court review.

A spokesman for the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office could not be reached for comment.

(Copies of the 19-page opinion in Commonwealth v. Blount, PICS No. 19-0444, are available at http://at.law.com/PICS.)