In 2006, U.S. Supreme Court decided the case of Kelo v. City of New London, which changed the landscape of eminent domain and spurred the passing of the Property Rights and Protection Act in Pennsylvania. Kelo was well over a decade ago, and since that time there have been very few major decisions in eminent domain. That changed this summer with the decision of Knick v. Township of Scott. Like Kelo, Knick will likely cause another shift in eminent domain law in general, and may also have broader implications for all due process jurisprudence.

In Knick, Rose Mary Knick, a resident of Scott Township, Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania, challenged a township ordinance that permitted others to access her property, without her consent, at certain times of the day because there was a cemetery located thereon. Knick originally brought suit in state court, seeking a declaration that the ordinance effected a taking of her property. Notably, Knick did not seek compensation by explicitly bringing an inverse condemnation claim, which is a state cause of action against a governmental defendant to recover the value of property which has been taken by the governmental defendant.

Knick eventually filed a claim in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. 1983 (Section 1983), alleging a Fifth Amendment takings claim. The federal district court dismissed Knick's action based on the case of Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, a 1985 U.S. Supreme Court decision which held that property owners must seek just compensation under state law in state court before bringing a federal takings claim under Section 1983. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, and Knick appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.