Recent events surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic have thrust many of our core institutions into renewed focus—and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is no exception. Faced with a multitude of issues pertaining to the ongoing crisis, the court has been forced to carefully consider the contours of its supervisory power over the judiciary. In the end, the court's actions reflect a measured approach, which seeks to balance the need for immediate and decisive action, without an arrogation of power by the judiciary or an excessive concentration of that power in the Supreme Court. To underscore this point, we discuss the court's handling of several administrative and substantive matters.

First, by way of several successive orders beginning March 12, the court initiated the process of suspending judicial operations and restricting access to facilities. Notably, however, rather than reflexively mandating a sweeping shutdown of all operations, the court's directives were carefully crafted to protect certain fundamental rights. For instance, recognizing that— irrespective of the pandemic's severity and scope—the government cannot dispense with constitutional protections afforded to defendants in criminal proceedings, the court refused to grant a wholesale suspension of the rights to a speedy trial and the right to be physically present in all proceedings, see 3/17/2020 order, 32 M.M. 2020. Indeed, although the court's March 18 order ultimately altered the procedural requirements associated with the right to a speedy trial, it clarified that the constitutional protection to a speedy trial remains inviolate.

Second, while generally directing the closure of all facilities, the court instructed the judiciary to remain open where necessary to conduct "essential functions." However, rather than issuing an exhaustive list of all functions deemed essential, the court merely provided guidance, leaving the ultimate decision in this regard to the President Judge of each lower court. The court's acknowledgment that the local judges are better situated to decide what is "essential" in their respective communities and courts is a commendable sign of humility and restraint, which stands in contrast to the Executive Branch's decision to override or supersede the decisions of many local governments.

Third, although its March 18 order suspended "all time calculations for purposes of time computation relevant to court cases or other judicial business," the court did not attempt to rely on the emergency as a basis for circumventing the constitutional prohibition against judicial suspension of statutes of limitations. Instead, recognizing that, even in a pandemic, our intuitions cannot exceed their constitutional powers, it advised (but did not mandate) courts of common pleas to accept filings for "commencement of a civil action, by way of praecipe for a writ of summons, for purposes of tolling a statute of limitations," and, in the event a court is unable to accommodate, it developed an alternative method by which such filings can be submitted to the Superior Court.

Fourth, and finally, the court's response to an emergency application seeking the release of a wide range of inmates from county jails warrants particular discussion and exposition.  Specifically, on March 30, the Pennsylvania Prison Society, along with a group of incarcerated individuals, lodged an application for extraordinary relief, asking the court to order an immediate presumptive release of several categories of incarcerated persons to prevent the spread of COVID-19 in county correctional institutions. On April 3, the court entered a per curiam order denying the request. Nevertheless, acknowledging some of the health concerns raised by the petitioners, the court directed the President Judges of each of the judicial districts, or their designees, to engage with the stakeholders in the affected counties and consider a solution that would mitigate the potential spread of the disease. The order, however, directed a "careful reduction of the institutions' population and other preventative measures," and rejected the broad relief sought by the petitioners because their application failed to account for "the potential danger of inmates to victims and the general population, as well as the diversity of situations present within individual institutions and communities, which vary dramatically in size and population density." Once again, rather than reflexively engaging in constitutionally dubious decision-making and prescribing a single solution to a complex problem, the court chose to exercise its supervisory authority conscientiously and tasked each individual judicial district to craft an appropriate response.

Although the pandemic will undoubtedly engender further action from our Supreme Court, we remain optimistic that its measured response in the face of an ongoing crisis will continue.

Mark Seiberling, partner at Kleinbard, practices primarily in the areas of complex commercial litigation, appellate litigation, Right-to-Know Law, education, and white-collar criminal defense and internal corporate investigations.  

Shohin Vance is an associate in the firm's litigation department and is a member of the government relations and political law groups.