Courts have long extolled the benefits of stare decisis, saying that it “promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991). Indeed, it has been said that, without the doctrine, “we may fairly be said to have no law.” See Commonwealth v. Thompson, 985 A.2d 928, 953–54 (Pa. 2009) (quoting McDowell v. Oyer, 21 Pa. 417, 423 (1853)). Recently, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has departed from longstanding precedent in several cases—most notably in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597 U.S. 215 (2022)—leading some members of the high court to accuse it of making a “laughing-stock” of stare decisis. See Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2295 (2024) (Kagan, J., dissenting, joined by Sotomayor and Jackson, JJ.).

The public’s confidence in the high court has suffered as a result. According to a recent Gallup poll, the approval of the U.S. Supreme Court is near a historic low, with only 43% of Americans approving of its performance. The current approval rate is “statistically similar to its ratings over the past three years since it declined to block a Texas abortion law in 2021 and later overturned Roe v. Wade in the landmark 2022 [Dobbs] decision.” See Megan Brenan, “Approval of U.S. Supreme Court Stalled Near Historical Low,” Gallup (July 30, 2024). Thus, there is ostensibly a direct correlation between adherence to precedent and the public’s view of the courts.