Mark Lubin of Chamberlain, Hrdlicka, White, Williams & Aughtry. Courtesy photo Mark Lubin of Chamberlain, Hrdlicka, White, Williams & Aughtry. Courtesy photo

Background

This article discusses the potential impact of two recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions—Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024), and Corner Post v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 144 S.Ct. 2440 (2024)—on tax planning and controversy practice.

In Loper Bright, the court overruled the long-standing "Chevron doctrine," which required courts to grant deference to federal agencies in interpreting statutory provisions that were considered silent or ambiguous. In overruling Chevron (467 U.S. 837), the court emphasized that courts (and not administrative agencies) have a "special competence" to resolve statutory ambiguities and stated that courts "need not and … may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous." However, it further stated that executive branch judgment may inform that inquiry, and that agency action consistent with constitutionally valid delegations of authority must be respected. It also stopped short of invalidating prior judicial decisions that applied the Chevron doctrine.

In Corner Post, the court considered application of the "default" statute of limitations for actions against the United States, including challenges to federal regulations under the Administrative Procedure Act (28 U.S.C. Section 2401(a)). Under that statute, such actions must be commenced within six years after the right of action first "accrues." Corner Post considered whether the limitations period commenced when the relevant regulations were finalized or when the affected plaintiff first sustained injury thereunder. (The plaintiff in Corner Post had commenced business more than six years after the regulation at issue was finalized, so its action would have been barred under the former approach.) The court ruled that in the matter before it limitations period commenced when the plaintiff first suffered injury.