Trends in the Law

BY Gerald J. Williams Special to the Law Weekly





In Wack v. Farmland Industries Inc., PICS Case No. 99-2383 (Pa. Super. Dec. 27, 1999) Eakin, J. (11 pages), a unanimous panel of the Pennsylvania Superior Court last month concluded that claims for personal injury damages may be brought under the Storage Tank and Spill Prevention Act, 35 P.S. ??6021.101 et seq. ["STSPA"].





While, at first blush, the court’s conclusion may seem a mere incremental outgrowth of clear precedent, it promises to have a far-reaching and laudable impact on the litigation of environmental torts in Pennsylvania.



For claims based on exposure to a wide variety of hazardous substances, the Wack decision may well elevate the standard of care borne by defendants, assure the award of counsel fees and litigation expenses to prevailing plaintiffs and even alter the burden of proof in important respects.

Where it Started

The foundation for Wack was laid by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Centolanza v. Lehigh Valley Dairies Inc., 658 A.2d 336 (Pa. 1995).



In Centolanza, the state high court held that a private plaintiff could bring a suit for damages under the STSPA. The court’s opinion was premised on time-honored principles of statutory construction.



The STSPA is a remedial statute and its intended scope includes the imposition of liability for “all damages” caused by storage tank-related environmental contamination. While the General Assembly did not specifically define damages for purposes of the act, the Supreme Court recognized that “ambiguous language of a remedial act must be liberally construed.”



The court therefore had little problem holding that the provisions of the STSPA would apply in a damages action, even one seeking damages not specifically listed in the statute.



The Supreme Court explicitly invited the General Assembly to provide any necessary “clarification” of its intent. Significantly, the legislature ignored an industry-led effort to amend the statute to overrule Centolanza. The 1998 amendments to the STSPA left untouched the provisions construed in Centolanza.



Thus, by the time Wack was decided on Dec. 27, 1999, there remained little reason to doubt the wisdom of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the act, and no reasonable basis for resisting its application to claims for personal injury damages.

Evening the Field