The discovery rule is an exception to the general rule that once the statutory period is over, the party is barred from bringing suit.
“The discovery rule provides that where the existence of the injury is not known to the complaining party and such knowledge cannot reasonably be ascertained within the prescribed statutory period, the limitations period does not begin to run until the discovery of the injury is reasonably possible,” Zappala said.
Murphy filed her suit more than 27 months after the surgery, three months after the statute of limitations expired. But the plaintiff claimed the discovery rule applied to toll the limitations period in her case because she did not know, nor should she have known, that the defendant’s suturing was the cause of her pain.
Murphy argued on appeal that the suit should not have been dismissed because whether she exercised due diligence in discovering the cause of her pain was a question for the jury to decide.
Zappala disagreed, finding Murphy knew or should have known of her injury and its causal connection to the surgeon shortly after the surgery, more than two years before she filed suit.
“The severity and continuation of the pain reasonably should have put appellants on notice that the discomfort was not normal post-operative pain, but rather an actionable injury,” the judge wrote.
At the very least, Zappala said, the plaintiff certainly knew of her injury and its cause after the exploratory surgery confirming that the suture was causing her pain, which was within the two-year limitations period.
“Appellants diligently investigated to determine the medical cause of the injury, but failed to file the action within the statutory period,” the judge noted. “While appellant may be said to have exercised diligence in seeking medical care, she did not exercise diligence in seeking legal relief. The two are not synonymous.”
Supporting Reversal
Cappy wrote the decision in support of reversal of the Superior Court, finding the discovery rule should apply to extend the limitations period in this case.
“Under the opinion in support of affirmance, patients will be compelled to file suit before they know whether their pain is linked to a physician’s action or is a normal side effect of the treatment or procedure,” Cappy wrote. “This compulsion to file suit harms all parties to the action, including physicians and hospitals, as well as their patients.”
Cappy said the Superior Court and the opinion supporting affirmance incorrectly focused on Murphy’s “continued and severe pain” as preventing reasonable minds from differing about her knowledge of her injury and its cause.
“Although the opinion in support of affirmance may be attempting to create a bright line rule by turning the grant of summary judgment on appellant’s pain, this standard charges appellant with an unrealistic burden of knowledge,” Cappy wrote. “This charges the patient with the knowledge that a medical professional would possess instead of that of a reasonable layperson.”
Cappy also pointed out that a situation may arise where a plaintiff does not discover her injury and its cause until the end of the statutory period. Pursuant to the opinion in support of affirmance, that plaintiff would still have to file a claim, even if the filing deadline were only 24 hours away.
However, should the same plaintiff discover her injury one day after the limitations period runs out, the discovery rule would apply, allowing two more years for filing a claim.
In the opinion supporting affirmance, Zappala conceded that discrepancy “may seem unfair to some,” but he said such a result is “inevitable.”
Cappy declined to take such a laissez-faire approach.
“We believe that such a result is not merely unfair, but absurd and contrary to the purpose of the discovery rule.”
