In Commonwealth v. Cruttenden, No. 58 MAP 2011, 2012 Pa. LEXIS 2906 (December 17, 2012), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a law enforcement officer, in possession of a suspect’s cellphone, did not perform an “interception” under Pennsylvania’s Wiretap Act when the officer, pretending to be the suspect, exchanged text messages with a co-defendant. The holding certainly has consequences regarding Pennsylvania’s Wiretap Act and the interpretation of that act by Pennsylvania courts, which generally view wiretap issues and privacy issues differently than the U.S. Supreme Court.

The more interesting question is whether it signals a step back from the court’s tendency to rule more liberally in criminal procedure and privacy matters than has the U.S. Supreme Court in recent years.

Texting and the Wiretap Act

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