U.S. Sup. Ct.;
15–457

Orders granting or denying class certification are inherently interlocutory, hence not immediately reviewable under 28 U. S. C. §1291,which empowers federal courts of appeals to review only “final decisions of the district courts.” In Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, a 1978 decision, this Court held that the death-knell doc-trine—which rested on courts' recognition that a denial of class certification would sometimes end a lawsuit for all practical purposes—did not warrant mandatory appellate jurisdiction of certification orders. Id., at 470, 477. Although the death-knell theory likely “enhanced the quality of justice afforded a few litigants,” it did so at a heavy cost to §1291's finality requirement. Id., at 473. First, the potential for multiple interlocutory appeals inhered in the doctrine. See id., at 474. Second, the death-knell theory forced appellate courts indiscriminately into the trial process, circumventing the two-tiered “screening procedure” Congress established for interlocutory appeals in 28 U. S. C. §1292(b). Id., at 474, 476. Finally, the doctrine “operat[ed] only in favor of plaintiffs,” even though the class-certification question may be critically important to defendants as well. Id., at 476.

Two decades later, in 1998, after Congress amended the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U. S. C. §2071 et seq., to empower this Court to promulgate rules providing for interlocutory appeal of orders “not otherwise provided for [in §1292],” §1292(e), this Court approved Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f). Rule 23(f) authorizes “permissive interlocutory appeal” from adverse class-certification orders in “the sole discretion of the court of appeals.” 28 U. S. C. App., p. 815. This discretionary arrangement was the product of careful calibration on the part of the rulemakers.