Burgess v. Denton County

The appellants filed this interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial of their motion for a temporary injunction during the pendency of their declaratory judgment action. This appeal arises out of the appellant's challenge to a fee assessed by the district clerk and county clerk of Denton County for service of citation by certified mail. Texas Local Government Code §118.131 allows the commissioners court to set a reasonable fee for service by certified mail by a sheriff or constable, and if the commissioners court has done so, then the district clerk must charge the same fee. For services for which the commissioners court has not set a fee, the fees for the services "are those fees provided by law in effect on August 31, 1981." The trial court's denial of pleas to the jurisdiction is affirmed, and the order denying a temporary injunction is reversed and remanded. Fort Worth Court of Appeals, No. 02-10-00279-CV, 01-19-2012.

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OPINION

Appellants Victor J. Burgess, individually and d/b/a Eydie’s Bail Bonds, and Edith Burgess, individually and d/b/a Burgess Bail Bonds (the Burgesses), filed this interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s denial of their motion for a temporary injunction during the pendency of their declaratory judgment action. Appellees Denton County, Texas; the Denton County Bail Bond Board; Sherri Adelstein, in her official capacity as Denton County District Clerk and as presiding chairperson of the Denton County Bail Bond Board; and Cynthia Mitchell, in her official capacity as Denton County Clerk (collectively Denton County); Ben Parkey, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Denton County; and Jim Dotson, Michael Truitt, Jerry Rayburn, John Hatzenbuhler, Ken Jannereth, and Ron Smith, in their official capacities as constables for Denton County (law enforcement defendants) (all collectively Appellees) filed a cross-appeal from the trial court’s denial of their pleas to the jurisdiction. We affirm in part and reverse in part. Because we hold that the trial court did not err by denying Appellees’ pleas to the jurisdiction, we affirm those orders of the trial court. Because we hold that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the Burgesses’ temporary injunction, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the temporary injunction and remand this cause to the trial court for the court to grant the Burgesses’ motion for temporary injunction in accordance with this opinion.

I. Background

Burgess v. Denton County

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