Michael E. Bertin

August 15, 2016 | The Legal Intelligencer

In Pennsylvania, alimony paid pursuant to a court order is modifiable upon a showing of substantial and continuing changed circumstances. This differs from alimony provisions contained in an out-of-court agreement that is incorporated into a divorce decree. In such an instance the alimony provision is governed by the terms of the contract and may only be modified if the contract provides the same.

By Michael E. Bertin

8 minute read

June 20, 2016 | The Legal Intelligencer

People may remember in the fall of 2014 a state Superior Court case, Huss v. Weaver, C.D. No: 2013-1209, was published where the Superior Court reversed a trial court's decision to sustain preliminary objections dismissing a complaint for breach of contract when a father did not pay $10,000 to a mother after he filed a complaint for custody, as their agreement provided that he would pay the mother $10,000 anytime he filed to modify the parties' custody arrangement.

By Michael E. Bertin

11 minute read

April 19, 2016 | The Legal Intelligencer

A common issue that faces ­family court judges and attorneys is whether a trial court can modify a child custody order when a matter before the court is not pursuant to a petition to modify custody. Oftentimes, this issue will present itself when a case is in court on a petition for contempt of a custody order or a petition to enforce a custody order. In the past, instances have arisen where trial courts have modified child custody orders when the issue before the bench was a contempt action. The line of cases that followed held that a trial court could not modify a child custody order if a petition to modify custody was not before it. Therefore, attorneys trained themselves to file both a petition for contempt and a petition to modify custody to be heard simultaneously in the event the relief sought would be to modify the custody order.

By Michael E. Bertin

14 minute read

February 13, 2016 | The Legal Intelligencer

In Pennsylvania, generally, a stepparent is not liable for child support of his or her stepchildren. The mere existence of a relationship between a child and the stepparent is insufficient to establish a support obligation for the stepparents, even if the stepparent is found to be in loco parentis to the child. The recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court case ofA.S. v. I.S., 2015 Pa LEXIS 3129, 8 MAP 2015 (Pa. Dec. 29, 2015), has sent shock waves through the family law community. However, it is to be noted that the Supreme Court does not appear to want the opinion to send shock waves through the family law community and create "a new class of stepparent obligors" and be interpreted as holding in loco parentis standing alone to be sufficient to hold the stepparent liable for support. Therefore, the A.S. case is not to be broadly applied.

By Michael E. Bertin

8 minute read

November 09, 2015 | The Legal Intelligencer

In September, I wrote an article regarding the case of W.C.F. v. M.G., 115 A.3d 323 (Pa. Super. 2015), pertaining to the reversal of the trial court's child custody order when the trial court's decision was inconsistent with the analysis of the child custody factors enumerated under the child custody statute. In the case of R.S. v. T.T., 113 A.3d 1254 (Pa. Super. 2015), a trial court's decision was reversed because the facts of the case did not support the analysis of the child custody factors contained in the child custody statute. More importantly, the case dealt with an issue faced by many in child custody cases. In the R.S. case, the trial court determined that the child's entrance into full-day schooling requires that one parent must have primary custody so that the child may establish a routine and consistency during the school week. Often in child custody cases, a parent will argue that it is important for the child to have a home base or primary residence during the school year. That was the argument taken by the mother in the R.S. case. Ultimately, the state Superior Court reversed the trial court and found that the evidence did not support such a ruling.

By Michael E. Bertin

6 minute read

November 08, 2015 | The Legal Intelligencer

In September, I wrote an article regarding the case of W.C.F. v. M.G., 115 A.3d 323 (Pa. Super. 2015), pertaining to the reversal of the trial court's child custody order when the trial court's decision was inconsistent with the analysis of the child custody factors enumerated under the child custody statute. In the case of R.S. v. T.T., 113 A.3d 1254 (Pa. Super. 2015), a trial court's decision was reversed because the facts of the case did not support the analysis of the child custody factors contained in the child custody statute. More importantly, the case dealt with an issue faced by many in child custody cases. In the R.S. case, the trial court determined that the child's entrance into full-day schooling requires that one parent must have primary custody so that the child may establish a routine and consistency during the school week. Often in child custody cases, a parent will argue that it is important for the child to have a home base or primary residence during the school year. That was the argument taken by the mother in the R.S. case. Ultimately, the state Superior Court reversed the trial court and found that the evidence did not support such a ruling.

By Michael E. Bertin

6 minute read

September 08, 2015 | The Legal Intelligencer

The recent case of W.C.F. v. M.G., 115 A.3d 323 (Pa. Super. 2015), addresses numerous issues often faced by family law practitioners. The relevant factors of the case are as follows: W.C.F. (the father) and M.G. (the mother) were previously married and had one child. The parents of the mother (who is a native of Malaysia) resided with the parties in the parties' apartment since prior to the parties' child being born. Once the child was born, according to the opinion, the maternal grandmother had been the primary caretaker of the child. As reflected in the opinion: "As a result of father's belief that mother's family, in particular maternal grandmother, was blocking his attempts to bond with child, the parties agreed that maternal grandparents would move out of the parties' apartment and obtain their own residence." When the maternal grandparents moved out of the apartment, the mother took the child and vacated with her parents.

By Michael E. Bertin

7 minute read

September 05, 2015 | The Legal Intelligencer

The recent case of W.C.F. v. M.G., 115 A.3d 323 (Pa. Super. 2015), addresses numerous issues often faced by family law practitioners. The relevant factors of the case are as follows: W.C.F. (the father) and M.G. (the mother) were previously married and had one child. The parents of the mother (who is a native of Malaysia) resided with the parties in the parties' apartment since prior to the parties' child being born. Once the child was born, according to the opinion, the maternal grandmother had been the primary caretaker of the child. As reflected in the opinion: "As a result of father's belief that mother's family, in particular maternal grandmother, was blocking his attempts to bond with child, the parties agreed that maternal grandparents would move out of the parties' apartment and obtain their own residence." When the maternal grandparents moved out of the apartment, the mother took the child and vacated with her parents.

By Michael E. Bertin

7 minute read

July 14, 2015 | The Legal Intelligencer

In November 2014, the Pennsylvania Superior Court case of T.A.M. v. S.L.M., 104 A.3d 30 (Pa. Super. 2014), addressed modification of a child custody order under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act.

By Michael E. Bertin

8 minute read

July 13, 2015 | The Legal Intelligencer

In November 2014, the Pennsylvania Superior Court case of , 104 A.3d 30 (Pa. Super. 2014), addressed modification of a child custody order under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act.

By Michael E. Bertin

8 minute read