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Taxpayer, a corporation that sells electricity in Pennsylvania on a wholesale basis, was subject to gross receipts taxes under §1101(b) of the Tax Reform Code of 1971, which imposes the tax upon every entity that is engaged in the electric light and power business. The court denied taxpayers exceptions.
There was substantial evidence to support the Jackson Township Supervisors finding that a structure owned by plaintiff was a dangerous building as defined by the township ordinance, including expert testimony regarding a partially collapsed roof and the lack of any remaining intrinsic value in the structure. The court denied plaintiffs appeal.
Plaintiffs failed to plausibly state a claim for relief under ERISA in their action alleging that defendants breached their fiduciary duty to monitor 401(k) plan investments and remove risky investment options, after one fund invested heavily in the stock of a pharmaceutical company that lost value after it was investigated by the SEC, because the complaint failed to state a plausible claim for failure to diversify or a breach of the duty of prudence. Motion to dismiss granted.
Defendants were not entitled to open a default judgment where proper service was effectuated by serving the documents on the person in charge at defendants address, and where defendants failed to present a meritorious defense.
Publication Date: 2018-04-03 Practice Area:Criminal Law Industry: Court:Superior Court Judge:Judge Kunselman Attorneys:For plaintiff: for defendant: Case Number: 18-0385
Trial court did not abuse discretion in admitting and considering victim impact statement that contained single disparaging remark toward defense counsel, where, on balance, letter properly conveyed the effects of defendants crime upon the victims family. Judgment of sentence affirmed.
The Commonwealth Court rejected petitioners contention that the individual petitioner, the sole member and managing member of an oil and gas company, could not be held liable for oil and gas regulatory violations under the participation theory because the theory does not apply where the challenged conduct consists of inaction. The court reversed and remanded on other grounds.
Venue in this personal injury matter was improper in county where defendant conducted less than one percent of its commercial activities. The court transferred the case to the county where the accident occurred, which was also the county in which plaintiffs resided and where defendant regularly conducted business.
Publication Date: 2018-03-27 Practice Area:Criminal Law Industry: Court:Superior Court Judge:Judge Gantman Attorneys:For plaintiff: for defendant: Case Number: 18-0324
Counsel ineffective for advising offender to proceeding to parole revocation hearing prior to trail on new charges to secure work release, where offender may have been ineligible for work release, and was ultimately acquitted on new charges. Order of the PCRA court reversed, revocation sentence vacated.
Plaintiffs suit asserting a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim against the defendant law firm was untimely since it was not filed within one year from the date on which the alleged violation occurred, i.e., when the firm commenced a debt collection action against plaintiff. The court granted defendants motion for summary judgment.
The court found that insurer was entitled to dismissal of plaintiffs breach of contract action because, under the plain language of the policy, company could only claim under one policy, was not entitled to reformation of the previous policy and there was only one occurrence. Motion granted.